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LAW AND MODERNIZATION IN CHINA: THE
JURIDICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE CHINESE
COMMUNISTS
Daniel J. Hoffheimer*
With the increasing complexity of society, the public interest tends
to become omnipresent; and the problems presented by new de-
mands for justice cease to be simple.
- Louis D. Brandeis'
Where do correct ideas come from? Do they drop from the skies?
No. Are they innate in the mind? No. They come from social
practice, and from it alone ....
- Mao Tse-tung'
I. INTRODUCTION
The death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung signals the end of an era
of Chinese and world history. Because of the immense, incalculable
impact that his life had and will continue to have on China-and
therefore on the world-his passing symbolizes a transition which
should occasion intelligent reflection on the social processes and
institutions which comprise contemporary China.
This article is an attempt to place some perspective on the nature
of the Chinese Communist legal process and to suggest its signifi-
cance for modern theories of law and modernization. As a compara-
tive legal analysis, such an effort suffers severe disadvantages in the
form of limited access to primary source materials, 3 and of the rela-
tive novelty of Chinese Communist law as a serious subject of com-
* Member of the Ohio Bar; A.B., Harvard College (1973); J.D., University of Virginia
(1976).
' International News Serv. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 315, 262 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
MAO TSE-TUNG, WHERE Do CORRECT IDEAS CoME FROM? 1 (1963).
The paucity of Chinese source materials is complemented by the language barrier which
has precluded all but a handful of comparative lawyers from devoting serious attention to
Chinese law. The result has been not only a lack of fundamental understanding but also the
failure to include China - a country comprising one-quarter of mankind - in most modem
comparative legal studies in any detailed fashion. See, e.g., J. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR
LAW (1969) [hereinafter cited as HAZARD]; D. RUESCHEMEYER, LAWYERS AND THEIR SOCIETY 1-
2 (1973). For a survey of Chinese Communist legal monographs and other publications, see
Hsia, Chinese Legal Publications: An Appraisal, in CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW: RESEARCH
PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTvES 20 (J.A. Cohen ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as CONTEMPORARY
CHINESE LAW].
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parative and international legal research.' That is not to say that
excellent and illuminating studies have not been done, but rather
that much scholarship has sought to apply traditional Western ty-
pologies of law and justice to the quite different Chinese context.
Western categories of legal thought, however, are often inapposite
to Chinese legal processes, and an attempt to make Chinese institu-
tions and processes fit theories and paradigms evolved in different
cultural settings is likely to obscure the fundamental norms, as-
sumptions, and purposes of Chinese law. This conceptual problem
implies that comparative lawyers must acquire a firm knowledge of,
traditional Chinese legal processes, the Confucian legal theory and
practice which supported them for over two millenia, and Marxist-
Leninist-Maoist legal and social theory before their study of con-
temporary Chinese law will bear fruit. It is not surprising, therefore,
that few studies hitherto published have been able to combine seri-
ous sinological expertise with broad comparative perspective. The
continuing necessity for comparative lawyers to rely upon basic
skills of the social scientists has also inhibited the development of
more specialized postulates and theorems within the discipline of
comparative law.5
The intricate and complex relationships between Chinese social
and legal processes, however, serve to remind comparative lawyers
The Program in East Asian Legal Studies at Harvard Law School, for example, was
begun only in 1964, and the Harvard University Press began its "Studies in East Asian Law"
series only in 1967. See Harvard Today, Spring 1976, at 9, col. 2.
In fairness, it should be stated that international legal scholarship and research has suffered
fewer limitations and enjoyed greater success than comparative legal research. Of course,
analysis of China's behavior in both the public and private international law systems has been
much more susceptible to empirical evaluation than internal Chinese law. Accordingly, inter-
national legal studies of China have become relatively detailed and sophisticated. See, e.g.,
CHINA's PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (J.A. Cohen ed. 1973), reviewed in Hoffheimer, Book
Review, HAnv. POL. REv., Summer 1973, at 27; Bayar, The Blocked Chinese Assets: Present
Status and Future Disposition, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 959 (1975), reprinted in U.S. - CHINA Bus.
REv., 31 (1975); Lubman, Trade Between the United States and the People's Republic of
China: Practice, Policy and Law, 8 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 1 (1976). On the other hand, first
hand, empirical analysis of the internal Chinese legal process has been circumscribed, as the
leading scholars and comparative lawyers admit. Cohen, Chinese Law: At the Crossroads, 59
A.B.A.J. 42 (1973); Garbus, Justice Without Courts: A Report on China Today, 60 JUDICA-
TURE 395 (1977). Only one United States citizen, for example, has ever had the opportunity
to meet with Chinese judges and discuss details of the legal process. Id. at 395.
' Cf. S. VAN DER SPRENKEL, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN MANCHU CHINA 128-29 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as VAN DER SPRENKEL]. See also D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 8-11
(1962); CH'u T'UNG-TSU, LAw AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA (1961); CH'u T'UNG-TSU,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA UNDER THE CH' ING xi-xiv, 193-99 (1962); Bodde, Basic Concepts
of Chinese Law: The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Thought in Traditional China, 107 AM.
PHIL. Soc'y PRoc. 384 (1963).
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that one of the great contributions of modern sociology of law has
been the emphasis on and analysis of the continuities between law
and the society of which it is a part.' The ability to study the legal
system as a constituent social process has been somewhat stifled,
among other reasons, by the influence which systems and organi-
zational theory have had in all of the social sciences since the writ-
ings of Max Weber. Because Chinese law emerges from an entirely
different and autochthonous culture, the study of Chinese law
serves to refocus Western attention on the behavioral foundations
of the legal process and to deemphasize the less significant and often
misleading structural aspects.' In comparative perspective, more-
over, an understanding of Chinese law offers valuable insight into
modern Western law and into the function of law in the broader
social fabric.
Chinese Communist law is not the product of legislated codes, as
in civil law countries, or of jurisdictional expansion and stare decisis
I Bohannan, Law and Legal Institutions, 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 73 (1968); Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute Settlement
and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1967); [hereinafter cited as Eisenberg]; Koch, Law
and Anthropology: Notes on Interdisciplinary Research, 4 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 11 (1969).
Professor Harold J. Berman has recently underscored this confluence of the legal system
with other social systems by examining the origins of Western legal science as a distinct
ideology. "The term legal system," Berman explains, "is used here to mean something more
narrow and more specific than a legal order." Berman, The Origins of Western Legal Science,
90 HARV. L. REV. 895 (1977). Berman elaborates the emergence in Western Europe during the
eleventh and twelfth centuries of the concept of law and the legal system as autochthonous
from the social order-including the proliferation of law schools, legal treatises, and legal
rules and procedures. He views this development of a distinct legal system primarily as the
result of the Papal Revolution, the secular response to revolutionary change within the Catho-
lic Church, and the evolution of feudal society. Id. at 896-98, 941-43. While emphasizing the
formal changes in the nature of Western law, Berman is quick to argue that they reflect the
fundamental moral and intellectual transformation of the Western vision of man's destiny
which accompanied the waning of the Middle Ages. Id. at 943. See also R. UNGER, LAW IN
MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY (1976); Kennedy, Form and Sub-
stance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976). By comparison, the author
of the present article has elsewhere reviewed the interrelationship of pattterns of thought in
Chinese science and cosmology with the broader concerns of Chinese social thought. See
Hoffheimer, Science and Symbolism in Chinese Astronomy, 1 SYNTHESIS, Jan. 1974, at 24,
32. ("Chinese astronomy suggests that objective paradigms of physical reality are rather
meaningless outside the social context.") But cf. Letter from Nathan Sivin to the Editor, 2
SYNTHESIS, Mar. 1974, at 4, 5. Likewise, Chinese law has never emerged as a distinct "system"
or "science" to the degree it has in the West.
It may be noted parenthetically that political science and economics, as well as most
other social sciences, have not lagged behind as legal science has in analyzing the interrela-
tionships of the various social systems. See, e.g., K. DEUTSCH, THE NERVES OF GOVERNMENT:
MODELS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL (1963); S. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER
IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1968); B. MOORE, POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY (1962); J.
ROBINSON, ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY (1962).
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as in the common law;8 it is instead the creation of the Chinese
revolution and internal war, a mass political upheaval which has
been legitimized primarily by an ideology derived from Marxism-
Leninism. This fact cannot be ignored in an attempt to understand
the Chinese legal process. Analysis of legal behavior must begin and
end with an understanding of the interplay between ideology and
history in Chinese communism. Static frameworks of legal analysis
interfere with an understanding of the relationship of law to social
change.' Because law is inherently purposive and part of a dynamic
process of human behavior,10 a functional approach which foregoes
efforts at defining Chinese law" and aims instead at examining the
goals and dynamics of the legal process is far more likely to clarify
jural postulates, legal behavior and basic social values.'
This essay proposes a two-fold thesis. First, it will be argued that
the Chinese Communist legal process was evolved prior to the com-
munist victory in 1949 as a process integral to efforts at popular
mobilization, political development and social transformation in
the hinterland. While one does not have to believe all Chinese ideo-
logical postulates at their face value, it would be fundamentally
wrong to assume that Chinese revolutionary theory is not taken
quite seriously by the Chinese themselves. The pre-1949 period of
the revolution, therefore, continues to serve as a source of experience
and values for the ongoing progress toward the Communists'
broader vision of socialist and communist society, including the
legal order. A constituent part of the pre-1949 heritage is the distinc-
tive Chinese legal process. Because this process was fairly well es-
tablished in the early 1940's before the transition from the New
Democratic revolution to the dictatorship of the proletariat-before
See J. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 207-08, 226-27 (1960); F. MAITLAND, THE FORMS
OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (1936).
1 Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development, 4 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 29, 30 (1969);
Friedman, On Legal Development, 4 RUTGERS L. RV. 11 (1969); Seidman, Law and Develop-
ment: A General Model, 6 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 311 (1972).
"* J. HALL, COMPaRATIVE LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 104-10 (1963); E.A. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF
PRIMITIVE MAN 275, 333 (1954).
" See Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARv. L. R'. 1145 (1938): "Those of us who
have learned humility have given over the attempt to define law." Compare D. MANNERS &
R. KAPLtN, CULTURE THEORY 12 (1972) with E. SERVICE, PRIMITIVE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: AN
EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE 30-31 (2d ed. 1971). See also Gulliver, Introduction, in LAW IN
CULTURE AND SoCmY 11, 17 (L. Nader ed. 1969).
12 Compare Auerbach, Legal Tasks for the Sociologist, 1 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 91 (1966) with
Skolnick, Social Research on Legality: A Reply to Auerbach, 1 Aw & Soc'v REv. 105 (1966).
See also Galanter, The Modernization of Law, in MODERNIZATION: THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH
(M. Weiner ed. 1966).
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the establishment of the People's Republic of China-the Chinese
legal process offers significant insight into the role of law in revolu-
tionary Marxian socialist societies. As a distinct alternative to bour-
geois theories of law in more stable "developed" western societies,
in the Chinese experience the legal process offers important qualifi-
cations to commonly held western theories. Second, this essay will
attempt to sketch some salient contributions which the distinctive
Chinese legal process offers for modem theories of the relationship
of law to social change and modernization.
II. IDEOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS OF CHINESE LAW
A. Ideology and Modernization Under Socialism
Chinese legal processes are first and foremost servants of
Marxism-Leninism in its Chinese synthesis. Nonideological defini-
tions of communism, those which see ideology merely as a conscious
tool for economic development and modernization manipulated by
an elite, ignore that at the founding of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) in 1921, Chinese revolutionaries were not setting out
on a path of Stalinist industrialization any more than Max Weber's
Calvinists were consciously planning the evolution of capitalism.,3
The rather dogmatic ideology proclaimed at the First Party Con-
gress in 1921 is not that which in 1977 sends urban workers out to
the countryside to learn from the poor peasants how to be prole-
tarian revolutionaries! 1 It cannot be asserted that Chinese com-
munism represents a imionolithic set of goals and norms which has
maintained dogmatic coherence over time. The unity of theory and
practice, however, does not proscribe the flexible application of doc-
trine to specific historical circumstances, but the results of applied
theory certainly bear dialectical implications for the nature of the
original theory itself.5
The creation of a socialist society, before or after the establish-
ment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, becomes intimately in-
'3 Schwartz, The Reign of Virtue: Some Broad Perspectives on Leader and Party in the
Cultural Revolution, in PARTY LEADERSHIP AND REVOLUTIONARY POWER IN CHINA 165 (J. Lewis
ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as PARTY LEADERSHIP).
"1 After the death of Premier Chou En-lai and during the power struggle which led to the
temporary downfall of Teng Hsiao-p'ing as Chou's successor, rioting occurred in Peking's
T'ien An Men Square which overstepped official sanction. As a result, some rioters were
sentenced by "struggle meetings" to years of "re-education through manual labor." Wash.
Post, May 20, 1976, at A20, col. 1.
"5 See Geertz, Ideology as a Cultural System, in IDEOLOGY AND DIscoNTENT (D. Apter ed.
1964). See also E. TERRAY, MARXISM AND "PRIMnIVE SocIErmS:" Two STUDIES 66 (1972).
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volved with the administration of the state in the process of develop-
ment. It would be erroneous to assume, however, that "Maoism" is
simply an ideology oriented toward the achievement of "modernity"
as reflected in the developed capitalist states and that the legal
system serves simply to further this goal. Rather, Chinese Commun-
ists, with nationalism as but one aspect, have in the process of
revolution evolved a revolutionary political culture and have re-
sisted the static, procedural, and bureaucratic functions of the state
as the ideal type of a government oriented toward growth and devel-
opment. It would seem fair to say that Mao, like Weber, sees a
fundamental conflict between bureaucratic rationality and moral
values.'" Mao's attempts to continue the revolution after 1949 in all
social processes are an indication that he and his successors have
not been willing to sacrifice basic values to the formal rationality
prevalent in developed states, and, one might add, in the Soviet
Union.
The development process in China, therefore, is inextricably re-
lated to the class struggle. Attempts to create socialism involved the
proletarianization of the society, as well as its economic develop-
ment. The socialist state, in the Maoist view, constitutes a society
in the process of formation, not a static regime but a continuing
revolution in which social contradictions are lessened through the
political and legal process as the Chinese people approach a condi-
tion of spiritual liberation. Class struggle, in short, serves as an
integral process in the evolution of socialist society.
No one, including the Chinese, has yet proven whether Mao's
vision for China is completely compatible with modernization as
generally understood in western social science. Advanced industrial-
ized states, with their economies geared firmly toward economic
growth, appear to fit the "developing" category more literally than
China with her vicissitudes of revolution, Great Leaps and Cultural
Revolution. The very concept of "modem" itself as a condition of
society, moreover, is also subject to challenge.' 7 Mao and his col-
leagues have, however, evolved an alternative vision of society and
revolutionary modernization. The Chinese legal process is a signifi-
cant aspect of this vision. In some ways this vision resembles the
values accepted as prerequisites of development in the West. Mao's
assertion of ascetic values of hard work, self-sacrifice and egalitari-
' M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 334 (1947).
" Schwartz, The Limits of "Tradition versus Modernity" as Categories of Explanation:
The Case of the Chinese Intellectuals, 101 DAEDALUS, Spring 1972, at 87.
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anism, for example, may indeed create attitudes compatible with a
modern, more equitable society." The hsia fang system of sending
workers, and especially bureaucrats, to the communes would cer-
tainly seem to foster values of labor, productivity and equality, as
well as to prevent bureaucratic style, individualistic and elite inter-
ests, and wasted manpower resources. The legal process' resolution
of disputes also contributes to broader social goals. Yet while it
shares certain aspects of modernization experienced and advocated
in the West, the Chinese experience offers alternatives as well.
B. The Context of the Chinese Revolution
The Chinese revolution destroyed the Confucian ethos which had
provided the Confucian polity with its legitimacy for millenia. The
fundamental problem of Chinese politics and the central concern of
Chinese intellectuals for the past century has been, therefore, the
creation of a new raison d'6tat. The Russian revolution was quickly
able to discard the inefficient and inequitable tsarist autocracy and,
after several years of civil war, establish the Soviet state. In con-
trast, the Chinese revolution was a more complex process of salvag-
ing an entire civilization in danger of obliteration from external
encroachment and internal decay.
Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao, the two leading founders of the
Chinese Communist Party, carried on the efforts begun in the nine-
teenth century to create a new foundation for Chinese civilization.
The demise of the old Chinese world order had forced China to find
a place in the multistate international system which had spread out
from Europe after the fragmentation of Christendom. 9 The prob-
lem was not merely one of establishing a state structure, but of
creating a new political and legal culture with integral ideological,
sociological, and legal constituents. Ch'en said in 1914 that the
creation of a state depended upon the patriotic support and partici-
pation of its people. Revolution demanded not merely a coup d'etat
but the creation of a modem society.20
Chinese revolutionaries, however, did not seize Marxism-
Leninism simply as a rationalization for political power and as a
11 Andors, Revolution and Modernization: Man and Machine in Industrializing Societies,
The Chinese Case, in AMERICA'S ASIA: DISSENTING ESSAYS ON ASIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS 393,
401 (E. Friedman & M. Selden eds. 1971).
" Schwartz, The Chinese Perception of the World Order, Past and Present, in THE CHINESE
WORLD ORDER 284 (J. Fairbank ed. 1968).
2 H. D'ENCAUSSE & S. SCHRAM, MARXISM AND ASIA 204-06, 220 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
D'ENCAUSSE & SCHRAM].
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means of administering national development. Unlike Christianity,
for example, with its cultural relativism serving poorly to evangelize
a religious absolute, Marxism-Leninism succeeded in syncretizing
with the Chinese revolution because it offered an absolute, totalistic
doctrine based on a modern scientific critique of western imperial-
ism taken from the West itself.2' Both Sun Yat-sen and Chiang K'ai-
shek were dedicated to the establishment of national unity through
resistance to imperialism, the eradication of warlordism and politi-
cal development. Mao Tse-tung, of course, shared these sentiments
but was more impressed than they were with the example of the
October Revolution, the "salvos" of which had originally brought
Marxism, in its Leninist form, to China. 21
While the yellow peril was an unfounded myth, the white peril in
China was a painful fact of history. Lenin's theory of imperialism
provided not only a convenient explanation with which Chinese
Communists could manipulate symbols of anti-imperialism and
nationalism, 3 but it articulated in a comprehensive Weltans-
chauung the salient facts of China's predicament. Fifteen years
before Lenin's Imperialism, in fact, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao had carefully
defined imperialism as "the industrial power of the citizens of a
nation [which] has been fully developed domestically and must
flow to the outside .... ,,2
The Leninist conspiratorial party organization provided Chinese
Marxists with an instrument for putting their nationalism and so-
cialist aspirations into practice. Chinese rebellions in the past, they
realized, had failed because of insufficient organization. Even the
largest rebellion in world history, that of the T'ai-p'ings in the nine-
teenth century, had been crushed by the decrepit Ch'ing regional
armies because of its failure to institute effective organization. The
Leninist party, therefore, provided both the organizational power
for the politically conscious leadership and the rudiments of legiti-
mation for revolutionary authority. Theoretically, the Chinese Com-
munist Party would have educated the workers and led them to
21 1 J. LEVENSON, CONFUCIAN CHINA AND ITS MODERN FATE 117-25 (1968).
2 MAO TSE-TUNG, On the People's Democratic Dictatorship, in 4 SELECTED WORKS 413
(Peking ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED WORKS]. See also Schiffrin, The Emergence
of Sun Yat-sen, in CHINA IN REVOLUTION: THE FIRST PHASE, 1900-1913, at 444 (M.C. Wright
ed. 1969).
21 Wilbur, The Influence of the Past: How the Early Years Helped To Shape the Future of
the Chinese Communist Party, in PARTY LEADERSHIP, supra note 13, at 43.
24 LIANG CH'I-CH'AO, THE RENOVATION OF THE PEOPLE (1902), translated in CHINA'S RESPONSE
TO THE WEST 221 (S. Teng & J. Fairbank eds. 1954).
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victory over the counterrevolutionary classes.
Needless to say, the progressive proletariat did not exist in China
in any significant numbers. Marx's theory of history provided a
unique category for Asia in order to explain the lack of capitalist
development there. The Asiatic mode of production, nevertheless,
was a moribund phase, for capitalism, carried through colonialism,
was destined to extinguish all other modes of production. Chinese
Communists have paid little attention to Marx's Asiatic mode; they
have instead explained the retarded development of capitalism pri-
marily with his European model: the persistence of "feudalism"
from traditional society and, later, the inhibiting effects on native
capitalism of foreign imperialism-supported by Lenin's theory.2 5
This is indeed ironic, considering Marx's belief in the necessity of
colonialism to break through the Asiatic mode's static equilibrium.
The Chinese have thus been able to ignore the Europocentric, cul-
turally biased implications of Marx's theory. There is a profound
ambivalence between the Asiatic mode's retarded development and
Marx's romantic yearning to see at least a modicum of initiative in
the less "progressive," yet still potentially revolutionary, forces of
the oppressed Russian and Chinese peasantry. 2 In contradiction to
his general theory, he seemed at times to imply that countries like
China with little indigenous capitalism might be able to bypass its
capitalist stage through preemptive revolution against it.
There can be little dispute that both Russian and Chinese Marx-
ists have seized upon this latter voluntarist strain in Marx, to vari-
ous degrees, in their interpretations and applications of Marxism.
Lenin concluded that Russia would traverse the path of "non-
capitalist development," and Mao went so far as to uphold the
advantages of China's peasants being "poor and blank"" as a force
for development and revolution. But the lack of spontaneous mass
consciousness and the failure of Marx to foresee the problems of
political power and leadership led to an extraordinary problem in
the orthodox practice of the Chinese revolution. Some center of
political leadership was required for the seizure of power on behalf
of the proletariat and for the creation of the economic base for
socialism and communism.
2 MAO TSE-TUNG, The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party, in SELECTED
WORKS, supra note 22, at 307-09.
2s Marx, in Neue Rheinische Zeitung: Politische-Skonomische Revue, Jan. 31, 1850, trans-
lated in KARL MARX ON COLONIALISM AND MODERNIZATION 49-50 (S. Avineri ed. 1968).
D'ENCAUSSE & SCHRAM, supra note 20, at 10-11; PEKING REv., June 10, 1958, at 6.
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III. THE ECOLOGY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEGAL PROCESS
A. Agrarian Revolution
Chiang K'ai-shek's "white terror" of 1927 destroyed the hopes
that the CCP might establish an urban power base, and Stalin's
belated order of June 1, 1927, for the Communists to break com-
pletely with the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) alliance
and to establish independent soviets-the policy Trotsky had, in a
less adventurist manner, advised all along-ended in the almost
complete annihilation of the CCP. 8 This failure of both Stalinist
alliances and the Trotskyite version of "permanent revolution" in
China signaled the beginning of the Chinese revolutionary civil war,
a guerrilla struggle in which the Party of the proletariat was forced
out of the cities into the hinterland. It was among China's huge
agrarian population, ironically, that the CCP was to build the so-
cialist revolution and to fuse it with the development of modern
Chinese legal and social processes.
After 1927, circumstances created what Eduard Bernstein had
sought in Europe; the separation of the Party from its class base.
Covertly, in the Kuomintang-controlled cities, the CCP leadership
continued for almost a decade to follow the line handed down from
Moscow. But Stalin's fantasies were by now irrelevant to China; his
orders to the powerless Central Committee of the CCP could not be
implemented without a power base and led only to a series of ill-
fated putsches and subsequent purges of CCP leaders." The one
percent of the Chinese population which made up the proletariat,
moreover, was hardly enthusiastic about organizing with the CCP
in the face of severe Kuomintang repression."
Forced into the wilderness of Kiangsi province, Mao and the re-
maining forces of the CCP had no choice but to respond creatively
to the facts of their situation. Even before Chiang's coup, Mao had
foreseen the essentially agrarian nature of the Chinese revolution.
In his 1926 article Mao made no mention of the proletariat as the
necessary leader of the national revolution; only in the 1951 edition
of his Selected Works3 was reference to the "hegemony of the prole-
tariat" inserted. Thirty years later, however, this article was upheld
as the first statement which "correctly solved all the fundamental
2' C. BRANDT, STALIN'S FAILURE IN CHINA 117-78 (1958).
B. SCHWARTZ, CHINESE COMMUNISM AND THE RISE OF MAO 144-64 (1951).
L. BIANCO, ORIGINS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION 84 (1971).
S. SCHRAM, MAO TSE-TUNG 93 (rev. ed. 1966). Compare id. with MAO TSE-TUNG, Analysis
of the Classes of Chinese Society, in 1 SELECTED WORKS, supra note 22, at 16.
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problems of the Chinese Revolution." 3 In March 1927, still prior to
Chiang's coup, Mao had reported from his investigation of the peas-
ant movement in Hunan that "leadership by the poor peasants is
absolutely necessary. Without poor peasants there would be no revo-
lution."33 This was a far cry from the First Party Congress' exclusive
mention of the proletariat as the revolutionary class, 4 but it was in
far greater touch with the realities of rural China.
As the military forces of the CCP retreated into the hills, they
came into close contact with the one group which could be said to
represent the masses of China. In order to maintain their Leninist,
organizational existence, the Party had no choice but to rely, para-
doxically, on the peasant masses, particularly as a source of man-
power for the Red Army, the Party's chief defense against Kuomin-
tang encirclement.35 To Trotsky and other "orthodox" Marxists this
was seen as an indication that the greater proportion of the CCP had
ceased to be real Communists at all, 3 but circumstances left the
CCP little choice but to emphasize political alignments rather than
economic or social origins.
Was this an abdication of the class struggle? Lenin's theory of
imperialism had demanded national liberation as a prerequisite to
socialist revolution. His dispute with Rosa Luxemburg had been
largely a defense of the need for communist parties in colonial coun-
tries to ally with the national bourgeoisie and the peasantry.3 7 The
revolutionary guerrilla struggle against the Kuomintang was one
step in this fight for national liberation. Stalin, in one of his more
accurate and even Leninist characterizations, described the nature
that a revolutionary government would assume in China as being
generally similar to the government "that was being talked about"
in Russia in 1905, that is, a "democratic dictatorship of the proletar-
iat and peasantry-but with the difference that in China it would
have to be first and foremost an anti-imperialist government." 3 The
Party's isolation from its own class base and the need for political
31 Ho KAN-CHIH, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN CHINESE REVOLUTION 168 (Peking ed. 1958).
'3 MAO TSE-TUNG, Report on An Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan, in I
SELECTED WORKS, supra note 22, at 33.
3 CH'EN KUNG-PO, THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN CHINA 106 (1960).
3 Hofheinz, The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success: Rural Influence Patterns, 1923-
1945, in CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITICS IN ACTION 26 (A.D. Barnett ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited
as CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITICS].
36 Trotsky, Peasant War in China, The New Militant, Oct. 15-16, 1932, at 1.
" D'ENCAUSSE & SCHRAM, supra note 20, at 145.
" Id. at 227.
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alliances were quite easily legitimized by Lenin's theory of imperial-
ism.
B. The New Democracy
The excruciating dilemma of the Comintern in the 1930's,
whether to emphasize class struggle or unified national resistance
to imperialism, was not really relevant to China. From Stalin's pol-
icy of the "four class bloc" it was but a subtle and relatively natural
shift to Mao's 1935 speech "On New Democracy" which candidly
summarized the realities of class relations in China. It legitimized
for China the united front of all patriotic classes in the dialetical
development of society in the face of foreign encroachment. 39 Antici-
pating the Japanese invasion of 1937, the New Democracy created
both the class alliance for a united front and even the alliance of the
CCP with Kuomintang.
The united front theory of the New Democracy served, therefore,
not only as an ideology of struggle against an external foe, but also
as a legitimation for domestic social development in the
Communist-controlled rural areas.40 It required the mobilization of
the masses in national defense and national development and
thereby facilitated the integration of all classes into the nation.
With the national revolution theoretically part of the proletarian
revolution, the peasants were able to make the "qualitative leap"
from Nationalists to Socialists under the guidance of the CCP. Anti-
imperialism, nation-building, and socialist revolution tended to
merge, in practice as well as theory. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the New Democracy has now come to symbolize the entire
period from the May Fourth Movement in 1919 to the seizure of
power in 1949. 41
C. The Chinese Communists in Yenan
By the Long March of 1935 to northwest China, the CCP tempo-
rarily escaped the attacks of the Kuomintang and settled into an
extremely backward region of China,4" with their capital in Yenan,
Shensi province. Under the ideological banner of the New Democ-
" Id. at 251.
MAO TSE-TUNG, On New Democracy, in 2 SELECTED WORKS, supra note 22, at 341.
Li Hsi-fan, Intellectuals of a Bygone Age: An Appreciation of Lu Hsun's Stories, CHINESE
LITERATURE, Dec. 1972, at 24.
,1 One communist leader told Edgar Snow: "[Tihis is culturally one of the darkest places
on earth . . . .We have to start everything from the beginning. Our material resources are
very limited." E. SNOW, RED STAR OVER CHINA 253-54 (1938).
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racy, the CCP faced the task of governing and mobilizing 90 million
people in the united front, and later against the Kuomintang. The
Communist experience in Yenan,13 however, was far more than just
an anti-imperialist war; it became a process of economic and politi-
cal development in which much of the style of government later
applied in the People's Republic of China after 1949 was evolved
and institutionalized.
1. Mobilization and Participation
Popular mobilization was the single greatest task undertaken by
the CCP. The New Democracy legitimized the conscription of all
classes in the united front. Expanding the techniques learned before
the Long March in Kiangsi and combining them with new ones,"
the process of mobilization followed complex and diverse patterns.
In some areas the Japanese intrusions decisively affected the politi-
cal interests of the peasantry and led to the development of sponta-
neous "peasant nationalism."4 5 Elsewhere, the Communists' redis-
tribution of land and the alleviation of tenancy rallied the peasants
either to the ranks of the army or to industrial and agricultural
production. Above all, the Party's organizational presence, its abil-
ity to maintain a relatively stable rule of law in base areas, and its
capacity to expand-more than the peasants had ever experienced
from any Chinese government-quite naturally co6pted their sup-
port.4"
With the Party divorced from the proletariat, the army and Party
took on the task of preserving and perpetuating its consciousness. 7
"After receiving political education," Mao had said in Kiangsi, "the
Red Army soldiers have become class conscious,. . . and they know
they are fighting for themselves, for the working class, and for the
peasantry."4 The recruitment of the soldiers into the CCP elite, 9
11 Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China, 55
CALIF. L. REV. 1284, 1306 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lubman].
" Kim, Mobilization Policies and Techniques Developed in the Period of the Chinese
Soviet Republic, in CHINESE COMMUNIST PoLrrIcs, supra note 35, at 78.
" C. JOHNSON, PEASANT NATIONALISM AND COMMUNIST POWER: THE EMERGENCE OF REVOLU-
TIONARY CHINA 69 (1963).
"s MAO TSE-TUNG, The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance
to Japan, in 1 SELECTED WORKS, supra note 22, at 267-70.
,1 Yoshiro, The Great Cultural Revolution and Modern Marxism, 6 JAPAN INTERPRETER,
Spring 1970, at 48.
" MAo TSE-TUNO, The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains, in 1 SELECTED WORKS, supra
note 22, at 81.
"1 North & de Sola Pool, Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites, in WORLD REVOLU-
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especially from among the tenant farmers and 6I6ments ddclass~s,
not only broadened and democratized the Party, but began the task
of reintegrating the Chinese countryside which had undergone se-
vere "social erosion" since the T'ai-p'ing rebellion.50 Unlike the
Kuomintang armies which remained largely isolated in China's
modern urban fringe, the Red Army took the lead in what was less
a military strategy than a political process.5 Instead of emphasizing
technical expertise, Mao, like Stalin, emphasized mobilization, in-
tegration and social participation as key elements in the economy,
polity and society.
Both to legitimize Party rule and to co6pt the people into the New
Democracy, village elections became an important means of giving
people a voice and a stake in the government. Where they were
illiterate and backward, "the only method," said Mao, was "to in-
tensify political training, so as to effect a qualitative change in the
elements."52 By 1941 village councils included at least 45 percent
and often 85 percent non-party members; on the average 60 percent
of the council seats went to the poor peasants and 20 percent to the
middle peasants. Under the "Three-Thirds" system, neither Kuom-
intang nor patriotic landlords were excluded from participation."
Electoral politics became, therefore, one of the most important
means of educating and informing the illiterate masses. The prolif-
eration of newspapers and the expansion of the school system also
served to increase informed participation in the emerging political
system. 4 Increasing initiative and responsibility became both an
index and an agent of social change and development.55
The evolution of a politically conscious people demanded, in
addition to the development of an organizational infrastructure,
including schools, elections and newspapers, the psychological
transformation, of traditional attitudes and habits. Hesitancy in
approaching authority and traditional Chinese fears of legal auth-
ority, administrative, and political power 5 not only made more dif-
TIONARY ELITES: STUDIES IN COERCIVE IDEOLOGICAL MOVEMENTS 390 (H. Lasswell & D. Lerner
eds. 1965).
SFI HSIAO-T'UNG, CHINA'S GENTRY: ESSAYS IN RURAL-URBAN RELATIONS 127 (1953).
" Johnson, Civilian Loyalties and Guerrilla Conflict, 14 WORLD POL. 660-61 (1962).
' MAO TSE-TUNG, The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains, in 1 SELECTED WORKS, supra
note 22, at 81-82.
5' M. SELDEN, THE YENAN WAY IN REVOLUTIONARY CHINA 135, 168 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as SELDEN].
" Hofheinz, supra note 35, at 41, 43.
r' D. LERNER, THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY 45-49 (1958).
.' R. SOLOMON, MAO'S REVOLUTION AND THE CHINESE POLITICAL CULTURE 120 (1971).
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ficult the creation of a dynamic regime which must ultimately de-
pend on the enthusiasm of its citizens, 7 but also seriously inter-
fered with the CCP's struggle against Japan. The resolution of legal
disputes, village participation meetings, confrontation between
peasants and their erstwhile landlords, and group psychological
pressure and conflict served to mobilize popular participation in
and support of the regime. Activist cadres not only acted as media-
tors in legal disputes and generally as an organizational link be-
tween the Party leadership and the people, but, by leading them in
su k'u ("speak bitterness") meetings of criticism and self-criticism,
cadres manipulated private conflict for public purposes and mobi-
lized political consciousness for developmental goals.58 Sociologists
have argued persuasively that organized public conflict of this sort
can act as a stimulus for the establishment of new rules and norms
within the legal process and in other social systems. It is, rather, the
absence of institutionalized conflict and the internalization of dis-
putes which, by permitting no outlet for grievances, ultimately
tends to produce radical cleavages. 9 Mao sociologized law and poli-
tics, and he thereby emphasized class struggle within a broader
context of developing shared social values and aspirations, thus
producing a higher degree of consensus.
2. Production and Development
The Communists built on the developing peasant initiative for
carrying out the central task of any Chinese government: the admin-
istration of production in a huge agrarian society. All other CCP
goals, including the defense against Japan, depended upon success-
ful production. "What is Democracy?" asked one CCP leader. "The
first condition is that the peasants have plenty of millet, that is, the
people must eat well and be well clothed." ' 0 Under the New Democ-
racy, this meant a moderate policy toward middle and rich peas-
ants. So long as they worked the land, they were not ordinarily
expropriated. Landlords, after confrontation with their tenants in
People's Courts and struggle meetings, were allowed to have land
1, G. LICHTHEIM, MARXISM: AN HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL STUDY (1961); Morganthau, The
Dilemmas of Freedom, 51 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 717-18 (1957).
0 Solomon, On Activism and Activists: Maoist Conceptions of Motivation and Political
Role Linking State and Society, CHINA Q., July-Sept. 1969, at 88.
s' L. COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT 124-27 (1956).
Kao Kang, in Chieh-fang jih-pao (Liberation Daily), Jan. 31, 1943, quoted in SELDEN,
supra note 53, at 207.
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so long as they tilled it themselves.' In Yenan the CCP did not
attempt to form cooperatives beyond a primitive level.
In industry the CCP had to start from scratch, but by the begin-
ning of the cheng feng Party rectification movement in 1942, they
had arrived at substantive policies for industrial development.
Campaigns for production and the 1943 "production war" were, of
course, reactions to the critical economic circumstances in the face
of the Japanese, but they were also a rational synthesis of ap-
proaches to the development of rural China.2 Guerrilla war taught
Mao the need for decentralized management and flexibility in ad-
ministration. 3 Unlike the Soviet Union, therefore, dual rule rather
than industrial-branch management was implemented. Production
was decentralized to take full advantage of the min pan con-
cept-institutions run by and for the local people. While these ap-
proaches failed to follow certain formally rational principles, such
as more uniform mass production and specialized technology, they
did take advantage of reduced transportation costs and, most im-
portantly, the initiative and participation of the inexhaustible mas-
ses. 6 Based on Chinese realities, and with no similar Soviet or other
experience to guide them, the CCP had begun a new departure in
approaches to development and modernization. "We have," the
Communists explained,
created a new model for the national economy. This is a new form
since it is neither the old Bismarckian form of national economy
nor the Soviet Union's newest form of national economy; rather it
is a New Democratic or Three People's Principles national econ-
omy . . . . The people's needs can as yet only be met through the
impetus to organize provided by the Party and government and by
the action of the masses themselves.625
If the social wealth for transition to socialism were not yet extant,
the Party had in theory mobilized and organized society toward that
goal.
3. The Mass Line
Neither Marx, Lenin, nor Stalin had ever faced or foreseen such
'I MAO TSE-TUNG, On New Democracy, in 2 SELECTED WORKS, supra note 22, at 341-42.
62 SELDEN, supra note 53, at 264.
" Oksenberg, Policy-Making Under Mao, 1949-68, in CHINA: MANAGEMENT OF A REVOLU-
TIONARY SOCIETY 104 (J. Lindbeck ed. 1971).
" Selden, The Yenan Legacy: The Mass Line, in CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITICS, supra note
35, at 117, 139.
65 5 HUNG CH'I 99 (1942), quoted in SELDEN, supra note 53, at 143.
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an exigency where an established Communist government would
establish governmental authority and organize development over
vast expanses of territory simultaneously with the continuing revo-
lution. Lenin had withdrawn Russia from World War I and crushed
the civil war before embarking on the New Economic Policy, and
Stalin had thereafter hastened to establish a rational, bureaucratic,
post-revolutionary state to dictate the policies of socialist construc-
tion. He had even declared the end of capitalist remnants in Soviet
society. Traditional Chinese government had had weak vertical lin-
kages between the political and legal bureaucracies and fundamen-
tal social processes. It was, in theory, a sign of good government to
have a minimum of contact between the state and the people
through formal government apparatus. Ideally, imperial virtue was
sufficient to perpetuate authority and keep social relationships and
production running smoothly." The intricate relations between offi-
cialdom and the people were most commonly carried on by way of
informal channels of communication, especially through the local
gentry."?
Chinese society followed this largely static equilibrium longer
than any other society, with periodic cleavages being resolved in
favor of stability. Kuomintang tutelage in the early twentieth cen-
tury had continued this tradition of divorcing the state from the
people. Isolated in the cities, the Kuomintang regime mistook its
own stability for the welfare of the people." The CCP, on the other
hand, living among the people, could ignore neither the demands of
the peasants, nor the need for profound social change. The united
front with the Kuomintang and the CCP's transformation from reb-
els to rulers in Yenan spawned an entirely new form of leadership
and communication between the governors and governed. This was
true in law as well as politics. The politically conscious Party leader-
ship, in attempting to ameliorate the illiteracy and inarticulateness
of the general population, placed itself into intimate contact with
the masses. This intimate contact came to be known as the "mass
line." Unlike the endemic distrust of the masses by leadership in the
Soviet Union, the mass line institutionalized the initiative of the
people, guided by the Party representing, in theory, the long-range
interests of society. It thereby co6pted them into participation, ar-
" VAN DER SPRENKEL, supra note 5, at 29.
"7 CH'U T'UNG-TSU, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA UNDER THE CH'ING 168-92 (1962).
" Cavendish, The "New China" of the Kuomintang, in MODERN CHINA'S SEARCH FOR A
POLITICAL FORM 185-86 (J. Gray ed. 1969).
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ticulated and aggregated their interests, and mobilized them in pol-
icy formulation and implementation. "In all the practical work of
our Party," Mao said,
all correct leadership is necessarily from the masses to the masses.
This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsyste-
matic ideas) and concentrate them . . . . [T]hen go to the masses
and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace
them as their own . ..and test the correctness of these ideas in
• ..action. Then once again concentrate ideas from the masses
...and so on, over and over again in an endless spiral . . . such
is the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge. 9
In this way, for the first time in Chinese history, government be-
came something that the peasant could "touch, shake by the hand,
or even slap in the face."70
From traditional China, then, the CCP adopted an informal ad-
ministrative infrastructure through which information and policies
can flow and by which all social processes can be monitored and
manipulated. Such informality acts as a democratizing process by
legitimizing pluralist interests7' among the people within a frame-
work of shared social norms and by giving the people a role in
decisionmaking and responsibility in administration. The absence
of many formally rational Weberian principles, such as formal rules
of village government, institutionalized judicial organs, or laws reg-
ulating the conduct of officials, does not make the Chinese mass line
"model" any less substantively rational. A flexible approach was
peculiarly suited to the Chinese Communists' revolutionary situa-
tion and ideology. It served, furthermore, to bring political, eco-
nomic and legal process to a society which had long relied upon
village leaders, clan, and family groups for the regulation of social
conduct.7" The mass line was more than a mobilization style of
leadership; it constituted a basic approach to revolution and social
interaction. Integral to the mass line was the participation of the
people in the legal process.
" MAO TSE-TUNG, Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership, in 3 SELECTED
WORKS, supra note 22, at 119.
7o J. BELDEN, CHINA SHAKES THE WORLD 84 (1949). See also Carleton, The New Nationalism,
26 VA. Q. REv. 436, 437 (1950).
7' Scott, An Essay on the Political Functions of Corruption, 5 ASIAN STUDIES (1967).
72 Bernstein, Cadre and Peasant Behavior Under Conditions of Insecurity and Deprivation:
The Grain Supply Crisis of the Spring of 1955, in CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITICS, supra note
35, at 398.
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4. The Cheng Feng Movement
The success of mass line politics in developing the Yenan legal
and political systems also led to a twenty-fold increase in the CCP
membership between 1937 and 1941.11 Massive recruitment required
consolidation and the cheng feng movement of 1942-1944 was the
first intense attempt to consolidate the CCP's gains and reaffirm the
unity of theory and practice through Party indoctrination. As such
it was not only an admission of the separation of the Party from its
class base and from Soviet influence, but also an effort to bring
under control the natural tendencies of the Party and government
toward formal, elitist, bureaucratic styles of leadership which inter-
fered with the policy of the mass line.74
The first aspect of the cheng feng movement was criticism and
self-criticism. Essentially it was a process in which the masses were
co6pted into the process of dispute resolution, particularly in the
area of ideology - and disputes arising from unorthodox ideology.
Unlike Stalin's purges, there were no known cases of imprisonment
or even expulsion from the Party.75 Instead, the CCP's emphasis was
on the reformation of thought, confession of past wrongs, and a
willingness to fan shen, to "turn over" a new leaf and try again.
Criticism and self-criticism did not take the form of third-party
adjudication, but rather collegial negotiation and struggle.
The second salient theme of the cheng feng movement followed
upon the efforts to eradicate bureaucratic and elitist attitudes and
involved the reduction in status of personnel in all bureaucracies,
including the army.76 In contrast to Stalinist and later develop-
ments, where a separate Kontrol hierarchy was utilized to supervise
administration in the Soviet Union, the CCP employed overlapping,
dual roles for Party members in other administrative apparatuses. 7
Furthermore, by sending bureaucrats to the villages in the hsia
hsiang (later, hsia fang) campaigns to participate in manual labor,
the CCP attempted to reduce the social conflict resulting from ine-
quality of status and authority, as well as to prevent waste of re-
" SELDEN, supra note 53, at 190.
" See generally Deutsch, External Involvement in Internal War, in INTERNAL WAR 105 (H.
Eckstein ed. 1964).
7 SELDEN, supra note 53, at 196.
7' Id. at 110.
Schurmann, Organizational Principles of the Chinese Communists, in CHINA UNDER
MAO: POLITIcs TAKES COMMAND 86, 93 (R. MacFarquhar ed. 1966). See Lewis, Introduction:
Leadership and Power in China, in PARTY LEADERSHIP, supra note 13, at 1, 23.
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sources and foster economic development.78 The development of a
separate legal system, with judges and lawyers, was actively dis-
couraged.
Even formalistic and lip-service devotion to Soviet models had
proven irrelevant to China, and the cheng feng movement repre-
sented a thorough sinification of Marxism-Leninism to reflect the
achievements of the Yenan social revolution. "Chinese Communists
are Marxian internationalists," Mao said, "but Marxism must be
expressed in national form for practical realization." As an histori-
cal materialist, he asserted that "there is no such thing as abstract
Marxism, only concrete Marxism." By 1945, Liu Shao-ch'i had ele-
vated Mao's insights as "an admirable model for the nationalization
of Marxism" in other colonial countries.79
5. The Yenan Society
The cheng feng movement marked the consolidation of a modern
Chinese political culture over a vast population and territory. This
new culture contained the salient features of social relations and
intrasocial processes which would dominate, at least intermittantly,
Chinese social life until the present. By 1942 the CCP had estab-
lished in the hinterland during a revolution the foundations of a
"nation-state" by most criteria of Western political science, and
they had merged the processes of national development and dispute
resolution with a sinified ideology which preserved dynamic and
revolutionary values as the basis of social behavior. From the micro-
societal level the Communists had broken down the "feudal" state
through externalized conflict and struggle, and reintegrated the var-
ious social systems into a new cohesive whole. To a large extent this
struggle may be seen as the purpose of the Chinese legal process.
Karl W. Deutsch has elaborated the two fundamental stages of
social mobilization for political development as: (1) the destruction
of old habits, political alignments and attitudes; and (2) the induc-
tion of the politically conscious masses into new patterns of com-
munity, social norms and organizational commitment. 0 The legal
process was a constituent means of reaching these goals.
7, Lee, The Hsia-fang System: Marxism and Modernization, CHINA Q., Oct.-Dec. 1966, at
61.
11 Mao Tse-tung, Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee on the Popularization of
Propaganda, in MAO'S CHINA: PARTY REFORM DOCUMENTS, 1942-1944, at 253-54 (B. Compton
ed. 1952). See D'ENCAUssE & SCHRAM, supra note 20, at 208.
- Deutsch, Social Mobilization and Political Development, 55 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 493
(1961).
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In summary, Mao's New Democracy succeeded in realizing the
principles expounded by its semantic forebearer, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's
New People of 1902: "A state must be formed by the assembly of
its people."'' The Communists' breakthrough in successful nation-
building in Yenan was, above all, the result of the Party leadership's
own behavior and their astute manipulation of social processes, in-
cluding law. The manner in which the CCP responded to the crisis
of the Japanese invasion and the backwardness of the Chinese popu-
lace perpetuated and strengthened the Party's mandate. The New
Democracy's emphasis on political alignments over class origins was
instrumental in the early stages of mobilization and integration of
various social groups into a larger social community. On the micro-
societal level, the mass line served as an ideological rationalization
for the compromise, mediation and resolution of disputes. It would,
of course, be erroneous to view the New Democracy and the Yenan
social development and legal process it legitimized as the ultimate
goal of the Communists.82 It is true that the CCP established pat-
terns of behavior and development which closely resembled the ide-
als of "nation-building" and "modernization" dear to Western so-
cial scientists. However, it is now obvious that Yenan was but one
step in a continuing revolution which would lead to the People's
Democratic Dictatorship, the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, Col-
lectivization, Great Leaps, a Cultural Revolution, and numerous
other campaigns. Nevertheless, the basic patterns of the Yenan so-
cial process, including law have provided a wealth of experience for
the Chinese.8
IV. THE CHINESE LEGAL PROCESS
A. Law in the Context of Revolution
The discussion above provides a background necessary for a sur-
vey of the Chinese legal process which was consolidated in the
Yenan period. What is here labeled the "Yenan legal process" ac-
11 LIANG CH'I-CH'AO, supra note 24, at 220.
A2But cf. C. JOHNSON, supra note 45, at 30; F. SCHURMANN, IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN
COMMUNIST CHINA 107 (rev. ed. 1968).
" This has been called the Communists' "Yenan Syndrome." Schwartz, China and the
West in the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung," in 1 CHINA IN CRISIS: CHINA'S HERITAGE AND THE
COMMUNIST POLITICAL SYSTEM, (Book 2) 563 (P. Ho & T. Tsou eds. 1968). See Stojanovic,
Marxism and Socialism Now, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, July 1, 1971: "Utopia, then, is not ahead
but behind the Maoists." See generally D. Hoffheimer, Marxism-Leninism in China and th:
Evolution of a Maoist Theory of Society 84-94 (March 1973) (unpublished thesis in Harvard
University Library).
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tually began its evolution in the hills of Kiangsi province in South
China before the Long March of 1935 and has continued to provide
basic aspects of the legal process in the People's Republic of China,
sometimes alternating with periods which have emphasized more
formally rational, bureaucratic and institutionalized legal proce-
dures and structures. Repeatedly since 1949, however, the Chinese
have hailed the Yenan period as the formative period in the develop-
ment of the Chinese legal process, referred to as "people's mediation
work.""4 In view of the Chinese adherence to the principles of Yenan
justice, it is surprising that a number of studies of Chinese Com-
munist law have made only passing reference to the period" and
have instead focused attention on the systemic and institutional
aspects of the legal system, often ignoring the influence of informal
lines of authority and communication and the extent to which law
is defined by politics and other intrasocietal processes." Henceforth
an effort will be made to emphasize the behavioral aspects of the
Chinese legal culture and its continuity with the revolutionary ide-
ology and social development discussed above.87 The lesser import-
ance which formally rational legal institutions, such as courts, the
judiciary and statutory law, has assumed in China better enables
the student of comparative law to examine the dynamics of the
normative and behavioral aspects of the legal process. In modern
Western societies, the formal institutions have developed over many
years and, protected by precedent and an organized legal profession,
have often served to distort and obscure the student's understand-
ing of basic values.8"
B. Mediation and the Mass Line
As discussed above, the CCP developed its fundamental approach
to mobilization and social integration through the mass line which
1' E.g., Ma Hsi-wu, People's Judicial Work in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border District
During the State of the New Democratic Revolution, POLITICAL-LEGAL RESEARCH, No. 1, at 7,
12 (1955). See also Lubman, supra note 43, at 1309.
E.g., P. CHEN, LAW AND JUSTICE: THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN CHINA, 2400 B.C. TO 1960 A.D. 60
(1973). See A. BONNICHON, LAW IN COMMUNIST CHINA (n.d.).
16 See, e.g., Buxbaum, Preliminary Trends in the Development of the Legal Institutions of
Communist China and the Nature of the Criminal Law, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (1962); Lin,
Communist China's Emerging Fundamentals of Criminal Law, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 80 (1964);
Stahnke, The Background and Evolution of Party Policy on the Drafting of Legal Codes in
Communist China, 15 AM. J. COMp. L. 506 (1967); Tao, Politics and Law Enforcement in
China, 1949-1970, 22 AM. J. CoMP. L. 713 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Tao].
'7 Cf. Tao, supra note 86, at 713.
For an articulation of this view, see E.A. HOEaEL, supra note 10, at 6-9, 280, 333.
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became the essential foundation of the Communists' legal process
in Yenan, s and has since remained a salient feature." In particular,
the mass line style served the distinctively legal goals of manipulat-
ing and controlling interpersonal conflict on the microsocietal level
through "people's mediation work."'" Dispute settlement through
mediation had in China traditionally been considered morally and
practically superior to formal adjudication. 2 Confucianism had
viewed the legal process as one of the regrettable necessities of so-
ciety, 3 whereas the Communists in Yenan wholly revolutionized the
style and content of mediation and transformed it into a process for
change and a positive tool for social integration.
1. The Positive Functions of Conflict
One salient function of mediation94 is the settlement of private
disputes. 5 Traditionally, dispute settlement was a function of fam-
ily and village leaders, the clan, the guild, and, only as last resort,
the imperial magistrate and the courts. Conflict and lawsuits were
viewed as disruptive of Confucian harmony and strongly discour-
aged. 7 It was "better to be vexed to death," according to a Chinese
proverb, "than to bring a lawsuit." The Communists in Yenan re-
" See Lubman, supra note 43, at 1285-87.
N S. LENG, JUSTICE IN COMMUNIST CHINA 1-26 (1967) [hereinafter cited as LENG]; Tao,
supra note 86, at 753-55.
, See Yeh Ku-lin, Fully Develop the Role of People's Mediation Work for Serving the
Construction of Socialism in CHENG-FA YEN-CHIN, No. 4, at 12 (1964), translated in UNITED
STATES CONSULATE GENERAL, HONG KONG, SELECTIONS FROM CHINA MAINLAND MAGAZINES No.
461, at 1-2 (1965) [hereinafter cited as SCMM]; Leng, Pre-1949 Developments of the Chinese
Communist System of Justice, CHINA Q. Apr.-June 1967, at 9, 105.
" CH'U T'UNG-TSU, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA (1961); 2 J. NEEDHAM, SCIENCE
AND CIVILIZATION IN CHINA 543-83 (1956); VAN DER SPRENKEL, supra note 5, at 7-37; Cohen,
Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1206 [hereinafter
cited as Cohen]; Graham, The Place of Reason in the Chinese Philosophical Tradition, in
THE LEGACY OF CHINA 28 (R. Dawson ed. 1964). See Schwartz, Some Polarities in Confucian
Thought, in CONFUCIANISM IN ACTION 50, 50-56 (D. Nivison & A. Wright eds. 1959). See
generally Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 637; Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on
Dispute Processing, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 63 (1975).
'1 Cohen, supra note 92, at 1206; Lubman, supra note 43, at 1286 n.6. See J.A. COHEN, THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1963: AN INTRODUCTION 9-18
(1968).
" For a general overview of Chinese Communist mediation theory, see Cohen, supra note
92, at 1201-06; Lubman, supra note 43, at 1284-1309.
" See V. AUBERT, ELEMENTS OF SOCIOLOGY 130-36 (1967); A. EPSTEIN, JURIDICAL TECHNIQUES
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 12 (1954); Gulliver, Negotiations as a Model of Dispute Settlement:
Towards A General Model, 7 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 667, 674-85 (1973).
See generally VAN DER SPRENKEL, supra note 5.
" See Cohen, supra note 92, at 1206-09.
19771
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
jected the static philosophy of Confucian harmony for a vital pro-
cess which served to place positive value on public displays of social
conflict. By making mediation a public process through the mass
line style, local level organizations, party committees, struggle
meetings, su k'u, and the cheng feng, the CCP made government
visible and accessible to the people. Justice, therefore, assumed a
purposive value, not something to be shunned.
Conflict also served the function of accentuating the class struggle
and thereby serving the longer-range ideological goals of the leader-
ship. The mediation of peasant-landlord disputes in Yenan, for ex-
ample, linked the ordinary resolution of individual disputes with the
ideological emphasis of the Party's class base-the "proletariat" of
the future. Thus, soon after 1949, the CCP was able to move beyond
the New Democracy to the People's Democratic Dictatorship and
the Dictatorship of the Proletariat by manipulating conflict within
and between different classes. Visible public mediation in Yenan
served to focus peasant hatred upon exploitive landlords and facili-
tate and legitimize the redistribution of land and capital, such re-
distribution being necessary for the increased production required
by the war against Japan. Individual mediation politicized private
disputes and brought Party mediators to the administration of jus-
tice at the "lawsuit level," thereby enabling the leadership, through
persuasion, education, and controlled coercion, to expand the new
Communist ethos, with its new political and legal culture. Individ-
ual justice, in short, served primarily not to preserve social equilib-
rium but to destroy the old equilibrium and replace it with new
norms compatible with the Maoist vision.
2. Reformation of Thought and Ideology
The Party's use of mediation brought the educated leaders into
close contact with the masses on a continuing basis. This closeness
was a prerequisite to any propaganda effort or even rudimentary
education. In Yenan, such communication was necessary to foster
basic learning skills in order to increase crop yield and production.
Dispute resolution and the legal process served as a cybernetic in-
frastructure for socialist education. "Contradictions among the peo-
ple," later developed into a broader Maoist theory,9" even in its
rudimentary Yenan form, offered a theory which legitimized and
" MAO TSE-TUNG, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People, in
COMMUNIST CHINA: POLICY DOCUMENTS WITH ANALYSIS, 1955-1959, at 273 (R. Bowie & J. Fair-
bank eds. 1962).
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proselytized the new ideology and discredited the traditional, holis-
tic conceptions of Confucianism. Even the basic notions of a class
system and class conflict were new to the Chinese peasant. Such
notions would be essential to the future creation of socialism, and
the Yenan legal process served to emphasize the importance of cor-
rect thought and ideology in individual interpersonal conflicts.9
Mediation served not only to educate the masses but also to rec-
tify the ideology of Party members. The cheng feng rectification
movement of 1942-1944 served, above all, to adapt Marxism-
Leninism to its Chinese environment and to preserve its significance
in the face of peasant backwardness. 10 The movement constituted
a massive effort at dispute settlement within the Party, govern-
ment, and army bureaucracies in an effort to make social processes
serve Yenan development.
3. Mobilization and Participation
People's mediation work served to create attitudes of participa-
tion in the Communist political system by providing easy access to
a system of justice for the masses. Mediation supplemented the
more formal state and Party apparatuses by keeping the people
aware of their relationships with the Communists and of the positive
role which government could play in providing simple justice. Mass
trials, struggle meetings and the like mobilized the people toward
the social goals developed and implemented through the mass
line. 1°1 More than anything else, the mediation process taught the
people that law was not an evil to be avoided, but was a positive
instrument of progress.
4. Institutionalization of Informality
Informal methods of dispute settlement are often seen as irra-
tional and ever approaching the ideal of formal rationality without
which there can be no guaranteed rule of law. 102 Adjudication is
frequently contrasted with and viewed as superior to mediation as
an institutionalized aspect of the legal process. The Chinese Com-
munist mass line justice developed in Yenan, however, reveals dis-
tinct advantages of informal methods of the legal process which are
1" See Tay, Law in Communist China-Part I, 6 SYDNEY L. REv. 153,166 (1969).
0 See generally MAO'S CHINA: PARTY REFORM DOCUMENTS, 1942-1944, supra note 79.
,01 LENG, supra note 90, at 20.
,02 M. WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 13 (1954). See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 89-95 (1961).
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perhaps "formally irrational," yet "substantially rational," in
Weber's typology. 10 3 The manipulation and ordered facilitation of
conflict in the Yenan legal process, also served the rational goals
both of conserving scarce personnel resources and of emphasizing
the initiative of individuals over institutions. Such initiative was
keenly prized under revolutionary conditions when national self-
defense was a prerequisite to all other social and ideological goals.
The combination of judicial, administrative and political functions
through mediation reduced the burcaucratic mechanisms otherwise
necessary where governmental resources are more plentiful and in-
stitutions are more functionally specialized.
The value assigned to transinstitutional authority in people's
mediation work is clearly reflected in the campaigns against bureau-
cratism which pervaded the Yenan period, particularly in the cheng
feng movement. 4 Once again, the use of informality in the legal
process served to prevent the alienation of legal institutions into a
relatively autonomous system, and the CCP thereby was able to
retain greater unifed control over all social processes-control abso-
lutely essential to the continuing revolution. Not surprisingly,
therefore, mediation has been of continuing value to Chinese society
up to the present day.105
C. Mediation in Contemporary China-A Sketch'6
Because the purpose of this article is to suggest some of the
IO0 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 645. Even where it is not explicitly stated, adjudication is
often assumed to be the fulcrum of a stable legal order. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 235 (1971).
,o See note 100 supra.
See Hao Chin-sh'ing & Wu Chien-fa, Defining the Five Types of Contradictions in
Political-Legal Work and the Two Methods of Handling Them, translated in UNITED STATES
JOINT PUBLICATION RESEARCH SERVICE No. 22, 989, at 52 (1964) [hereinafter cited as JPRS];
Hsieh Chueh-tsai Delivers Report on Work of Supreme People's Court at First Session of 3d
National People's Congress, UNITED STATES CONSULATE GENERAL, HONG KONG, CURRENT
BACKGROUND, No. 751, at 6-7 (1965); Yeh Ku-lin, supra note 91, at 1-2; People's Mediation
Organizations Develop Great Effect to Strengthen Unity and Promote Production, HSIN-HUA,
Dec. 19, 1954, translated in UNITED STATES CONSULATE GENERAL, HONG KONG, SURVEY OF CHINA
MAINLAND PRESS No. 960, at 23 (1955) (hereinafter cited as SCMP] See also SHAN-KAN-NING
PING-CH'u TS'AN-I-HuI WEN-HSIEN HUI-CHI (Compilaton of Documents of the People's Politi-
cal Council of the Shan-Kan-Ning Border Region) (1958), translated in LENG, supra note 90,
at 13; Wash. Post, May 3, 1976, at A21, col. 6.
'0 For elaborations upon this brief outline, see Brown, Present-Day Law in the People's
Republic of China 61 A.B.A.J. 474 (1975); Cohen, Chinese Law: At the Crossroads, 59
A.B.A.J. 42 (1973); Garbus, Justice Without Courts: A Report on China Today, 60 JUDICATURE
395 (1977); Lubman, On Understanding Chinese Law and Legal Institutions, 62 A.B.A.J. 597
(1976).
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broader behavioral characteristics and ideological and historical ori-
gins of the contemporary Chinese legal process, no attempt is made
to set forth a detailed description of the actual operations of people's
mediation work. In any event, such an effort would be profoundly
frustrated by the unavailability of significant empirical data. Nev-
ertheless, a bare outline based upon available accounts is instruc-
tive.
Prior to the Cultural Revolution in 1966, some foreigners had
limited opportunities to observe Chinese courts and legal proce-
dures in action. During the early years of the People's Republic, the
rudiments of a formal legal system based upon the Soviet model
were established. Law schools, including the prestigious Institute of
Law of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Peking University
Law Faculty, graduated judges and lawyers trained in law, and a
legal profession appeared to be developing. The Cultural Revolution
closed the law schools and curtailed formal legal education. Lawyers
were sent to work on the rural communes. Only recently have West-
ern lawyers had an insight into the present direction of legal educa-
tion. As in Yenan, the focus is upon the purposive function of law
in building a socialist society. For example, a 1974 statement of
several Chinese law professors of Peking University, made to United
States lawyers, stated:
We think that people's law should aim at attacking the people's
enemy, and defending the people's interests. In order to train judi-
cial workers or legal workers, we have to educate them how to
attack the people's enemy and how to defend the people's interests
in a better way. 07
These same professors stated that legal education is in a state of
transition, but the trend is clearly away from an organized bar, even
such as that in the Soviet Union.
In the early 1950's, a system of courts was established, again
based upon the Soviet model. The court system has remained for-
mally intact, but its operation and importance in the overall admin-
istration of justice-even during the periods of pro-Soviet atti-
tudes-has been far less significant than informal methods. The
formal judicial structure is based upon four levels of courts. Under
the Supreme People's Court in Peking are intermediate regional
courts, and under them are the provincial and local district courts.
The pyramidal structure is not unlike that established in imperial
,01 Quoted in Brown, supra note 106, at 476.
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China and under the Republic, but as with those formal systems,
informal legal processes are far more significant. Little is known
about the actual procedure in and operation of these courts. Very
few foreigners have ever seen the courts in session or had the oppor-
tunity to meet with the judges who sit on these courts.'"'
According to the Peking University Law Faculty, there is pres-
ently a formal trial procedure in China. Their description of it,
however, reveals that the purpose of a criminal trial is not simply
the determination of guilt or innocence, which will in most cases be
known before the time, expense, and publicity of a trial is expended.
Rather, the "principle is to serve the dictatorship of the proletar-
iat."
We have two trials. The second trial will be the final trial. For
instance, in any case that has been through the basic court. . . if
the defendant does not submit to the sentence, he can appeal to
the higher court, but the decision of the higher court is final ....
If he is not satisfied with the decision, he can appeal to a higher
court or any authorities concerned, but he has to serve the sentence
during that period.109
Only the People's Court has the competence to enter a verdict in
the formal court system. Even in this formal adjudicative process,
however, the purpose of the proceedings is to "carry on the mass
line, so in working out the sentence of the verdict we have to pay
all the more attention to relying on the masses.""" Thus, the aim
of formal third-party adjudication, especially in the criminal pro-
cess, is not revenge or only individual justice, but rather the public
education of the masses and the transformation of incorrect ideol-
ogy. The types of sentences accorded even the most serious
crimes-primarily manxqal labor combined with the diligent study
of Marx, Lenin and Mao-support the public function of law as a
developmental process. In a word, the formal legal system is em-
ployed in exceptional cases as legal theater for the benefit of politi-
cal and social goals.
Civil law, as well as criminal law, is an appropriate subject for
formal proceedings only in exceptional cases, such as where impor-
"0 Garbus, supra note 106, at 395. In November 1976, Mr. Garbus met with several judges
of the Peking and Shanghai courts. He was apparently the first United States citizen to
participate in such a conference, at least since the Cultural Revolution. See also Cohen, supra
note 106, at 42.
101 Quoted in Brown, supra note 106, at 476. See also Garbus, supra note 106, at 400-01.
1o Quoted in Brown, supra note 106, at 477.
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tant and fundamental principles of socialist ideology are at issue.
In the words of the Peking professors, "Civil law is an important
component in our socialist system . . . Our law is to protect so-
cialist property . . . . Civil law in China also protects the legal
rights of the Chinese citizen-to protect the 'means of consump-
tion,' not the 'means of production.' ""' This principle applies
equally to wills, accident cases, divorces and contract disputes.
The formal legislative process has also played a secondary role to
informal legal rules since 1949. On September 27, 1949, the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Congress adopted an Organic Law
for the People's Republic. This law has not proved to be nearly as
vital a legal document as the writings of Chairman Mao. Few other
statutes have been enacted. One significant statute, however, has
been the Marriage Law of 1950. It continues to provide the basic
framework for the liberation of women and children from traditional
oppression and repressive customs inherited from traditional
Chinese society. Among other provisions, it assures freedom of
choice in marriage and equality of rights between spouses. However,
the dynamic application of the law is to be found in the operation
of the neighborhood committees and informal mediation, not in
statutory construction.
Despite the formal attributes of the legal system in the People's
Republic, mediation and transinstitutional legal processes provide
the greater part of justice in contemporary China just as they did
in Yenan. "Most of the civil cases in China," said the Peking Law
Faculty in 1974, "can be settled by mediation without going to court
because there is a mediation committee in the local neighborhood
and also in the people's commune.' ' 12 These committees take var-
ious forms, but generally they appear to be comprised of workers,
peasants, retired people, housewives and party cadres-a cross sec-
tion of society similar to an American jury. They are extrajudicial
institutions which, as in Yenan, employ collegial negotiation and
mediation, rather than third-party adjudication. The subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of these committees is for the most part unlimited,
except for serious criminal or civil cases which are handled by the
public security organization and the courts. Disputes such as di-
vorces, breach of contract, disagreements concerning the use and
enjoyment of scarce resources, and a plethora of other cases are
"I Id.
"2 Id. at 479.
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handled by the mediation committees. Grievances are brought out
in the open, issues are clarified and compromises are reached with
the persuasion of the committee and after sessions of study of the
applicable ideological principles. As in Yenan, the mediation pro-
cess serves to conserve scarce governmental resources in a develop-
ing economy, to publicize and promulgate communist ideology, to
place responsibility for the administration of justice with the people
themselves, and to provide a ready, inexpensive and convenient
means of private dispute resolution which is entirely consistent with
the overriding and long-range objectives of the Chinese political
system.
D. Mediation and Modern Legal Theory
In the Yenan legal process and the people's mediation work devel-
oped from it, justice and politics are inseparable; they cohere
through the mass line. Despite the formal aspects of the system,
such as courts, statutes, people's tribunals, and some specialized
judicial or mediation officials,"' the administration of justice re-
mains a flexible instrument subject to the overriding considerations
of: (1) the revolutionary circumstances and (2) the ideological goals
determined by the Party.
The simplest explanation for the informality and structural
"deficiency" of Chinese legal institutions is also the most obvious
and superficial: that politics is supreme and that constantly chang-
ing revolutionary policies inhibit the development of regularized
rulemaking and dispute settlement institutions."4 Such a narrow
perspective degenerates into a mere power theory of law which views
all Chinese social processes as the result of totalitarian control."5
That powerful leadership is a salient characteristic of all Marxist
states is hardly to be doubted;"' totalitarian control, at least of
governmental functions, was also the ideal of imperial China"7 and
the Roman Empire."" It is, however, too simplistic a view of the
13 See Tay, supra note 99, at 166-69; Lubman, Form and Function in the Chinese Criminal
Process, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 535, 537-40 (1969). See also Lee, Chinese Communist Law: Its
Background and Development, 60 MIcH. L. REV. 439, 458-62 (1962).
" See Lubman, Methodological Problems in Studying Chinese Communist "Civil Law,"
in CHINESE COMMUNIST LAW, supra note 3, at 230, 232-33.
"I5 See McAleavy, The People's Courts in Communist China, 11 AM. J. Comp. L. 52 (1962);
Tao, supra note 87. Cf. HAZARD, supra note 3, at 23-25.
1e HAZARD, supra note 3, at 19.
117 K. WrIrFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL POWER (1957).
J' . BRYCE, THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE 4-11 (rev. ed. 1886).
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legal process to focus upon power at the top and ideal types. The
Communists in Yenan decidedly were not in total control of local
behavior, and it is certain that in a country the size of contemporary
China many facets of behavior on the micro-societal level continue
to escape governmental control. More importantly, the persistence
and, indeed, the refinement of the Yenan legal process in contem-
porary China indicates that the Chinese legal process is not limited
to any single stage of the Chinese Revolution. It has, with flexi-
bility, thrived in circumstances as diverse as the war against Japan
and the Cultural Revolution.
An alternative explanation for the Yenan legal process would
emphasize the Communist revolutionary goals and circumstances,
albeit changing over time, and the functional value which informal
mechanisms have played in fulfilling Chinese Communist revolu-
tionary goals during different periods. Such a perspective puts
Chinese mediation as a system of justice and social control in a more
accurate light.
It may, therefore, be suggested that the Chinese legal process
serves rather well to fulfill the two major functions of any legal
system: the settlement of disputes arising from past conduct and
the formulation of rules from past experience to serve in the regula-
tion of future behavior by individuals and groups."' For reasons
outlined above, the informality and flexibility of the mass line
placed the initiative for achieving legal results on the people them-
selves. Trials by neighborhood committee, su k'u meetings, and the
public use of conflict is integral to the Party's overriding concern for
popular mobilization and participation in the continuing Chinese
revolution. 20 Such controlled spontaneity, furthermore, minimizes
the externality and authoritarian impositions of the Communist
minority which would not have been possible if formalized third-
party adjudication were exclusively employed.' Peasants and
workers were thus not cast in the role of inferiors in the judicial
process as they had been traditionally. Peer pressure and persuasive
mechanisms were better able to contribute to the enforcement of
desired social behavior and to the internalization of new values.1
Although dispute settlement and informal, formally irrational,
"' See Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 637.
' Cf. A. EPSTEIN, supra note 95, at 12.
" See M. GLUCKMAN, POLITICS, LAW AND RITUAL IN TRIBAL SociETY 101-02 (1965); Eisen-
berg, supra note 6, at 655.
I" See generally J. THIBAuT & H. KELLY, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUPS 130 (1959).
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types of rulemaking are often viewed as static and free of normative
implications, 3 the Chinese legal process belies these conclusions.
Despite the widely held view that formal legal institutions are the
highest achievement of the Western social order, a new perspec-
tive' is induced by the Yenan experience and its continuing valid-
ity which emphasizes social objectives over adherence to legal doc-
trine and functional, fundamental social change over devotion to
structure and stability. There is little doubt that this legal process
served the revolutionary and developmental goals of Yenan society,
and it appears to be of contemporary value to the Chinese. It should
also remind us of the basic concerns of our own system of justice in
which the legal process serves not merely to resolve atomistic dis-
putes but as a mechanism for change. The ideals served by mass line
justice are underlying moral conditions of Western capitalist legal
culture as well.'25 The Yenan legal process, in particular, poignantly
reminds us that legal processes which emphasize conflict rather
than consensus may better serve broader social goals.'
V. THE MASS LINE AND MODERNIZATION
Western lawyers have been too quick to confuse functional con-
cepts of law with structural regularity.1'1 Western typologies of law
generally focus on the micro-societal relationships between govern-
ment on the one hand and individual behavior on the other.' The
result has been too heavy an emphasis in comparative analysis on
the effects of law upon individual rights, the individual's capacity
to predict and control the actions of government, his ability to use
the legal process to protect his interests, and his capacity to regulate
his relationship vis-A-vis his fellows under the law. Such a frame-
work is a relatively accurate means of evaluating the function of law
in many developed states, particularly the constitutional democra-
cies of the West. Comparative lawyers and social scientists, how-
ever, may fall into error in applying such models of the legal system
"2 V. AUBERT, supra note 95, at 133-36; Gulliver, Case Studies of Law in Non-western
Societies, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 11, 18 (L. Nader ed. 1969). But see Berman, supra
note 6, at 944; Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1685. See also R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS
88 (1975).
U See 0. KAHN-FREUND, COMPARATIVE LAW AS AN ACADEMIC SUBJECT 9 (1965).
" See, e.g., L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
IZS But cf. Means, Book Review, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1481 (1974).
'" E.g., M. WEBER, GENERAL ECONOMIC HISTORY (F. Knight transl. 1927); M. WEBER, supra
note 102, at 13.
"I See generally, e.g., GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL (M. Katz ed. 1957).
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to other societies. They tend to underemphasize the macro-societal
function of the legal process both as an instrument for, and by-
product of, social change. The modern Chinese legal process which
grew out of Yenan in particular (as but one period of the unique
Chinese legal culture over millenia) 9 offers significant qualifica-
tions to common Western assumptions about the nature of law and
its relationship to modernization.
The abused and confusing concept of modernization is, of course,
often contrasted with the static, stable, yet abysmally impoverished
and unjust social systems of the less developed world. Despite the
confusion of the meanings and methods of modernization, social
change appears to be one of the few contemporary notions which
approaches universal ideological acceptance. 13 Modern societies,
whether capitalist or communist, are ideologically oriented toward
change. The goals of change and methods- of attaining those goals,
vary tremendously and are often only vaguely comprehended by
those who advocate them. This is true in "capitalist" America, as
in "feudal" Spain, or in "communist" China.
This central, pervading ideology of change poses serious questions
and dilemmas for societies which prize and advocate the legal sys-
tem as a stabilizing equilibrium superstructure. The typologies of
law which continue to uphold seemingly immutable principles of
Weberian rationality should assume a new relativism in view of the
dynamic-and successful-Chinese legal process. There is no doubt
that Weber's typological approach and analytic genius have fur-
thered the understanding of certain aspects of social life as much
as Marx's ideas have enlightened other areas. Indeed, within
Weber's own framework, one is tempted to view Chinese law as
"substantively rational," even if "formally irrational.' 13' Weber's
widely held assumptions that predictability and procedural and
structural regularity are, of necessity, intimately connected to
modernization, as reflected in the rise of capitalism, are now open
to doubt. The bureaucratic development of Stalinist Russia seems
amply to extrapolate Weber's bureaucratic theory to socialist
states as well. The Soviets seem to have ignored the warning of
the dissillusioned German Social Democrat, Robert Michels, that
"socialism is also an administrative problem, a problem of demo-
" See Schwartz, On Attitudes Towards Law in China, in id. at 29.
'3' See D. Hoffheimer, supra note 83, at 84-90; Friedman, supra note 9, at 38.
'=' See Rheinstein, Introduction, in M. WEBER, supra note 102, at xlii; Trubek, Max Weber
and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 720, 729.
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cracy; this is not in the technical and administrative sphere
alone . . 32 While in theory holding that the state as a bureau-
cratic apparatus begins to wither away from the first day of the
proletarian dictatorship, 33 in practice the Soviet state has become
a massive bureaucracy not too dissimilar in many respects from
that in the United States. This is true in the legal system, as well
as in other sectors. Thus, comparative lawyers and social theorists
have often seen a Weberian "convergence" as an inevitable by-
product of development and have tried to analyze the Chinese and
other experiences within this framework.'
Whatever the merits of certain of Weber's theories to the analysis
of Soviet and United States experience, they are less applicable to
Chinese social processes. Initially, one must recall that Weber
viewed revolution as dysfunctional and irrational, something to be
ended before development could begin. The continuing significance
of the Yenan "model" to contemporary Chinese leaders indicates
that the Weberian assumptions regarding revolution are not shared
by the Maoists. The anti-bureaucratism and struggle campaigns
which have recurred throughout Chinese Communist history, par-
ticularly in the area of law,13 indicate that the Chinese have their
own ideas of social theory. Simply because the Yenan model has
competed with other forms of legal process since 1949 does not indi-
cate the demise of its significance. The recent emphasis by the
Peking Law Faculty on mediation confirms this conclusion.'36
The CCP, despite successive factional clashes, appears to hold an
alternative vision of the role of law in "modernization" which fits
poorly within existing western theories. Most obviously, the Chinese
legal process indicates the positive value which conflict and func-
tional disequilibrium can serve in both development and in the
continuing rule of law. This process may avoid the radical cleavages
132 R. MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES
OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 350 (1962).
33 Compare J. STALIN, FOUNDATIONS OF LENINISM 50, 125 (1939) and J. STALIN, ON
ORGANIZATION (1942) with L. TROTSKY, THE REVOLUTION BETRAYED 51 (1970). See also Cocks,
The Rationalization of Party Control, in CHANGE IN COMMUNIST SYSTEMS 187 (C. Johnson ed.
1970).
I" See Z. BRZEZINSKI & S. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL POWER: USA/USSR (1965). See also M.
DJILAS, THE NEw CLASS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM 36 (1957).
"I See, e.g., Chou Hsin-min, Law Is a Sharp Weapon of Class Struggle, translated in
SCMP supra note 105, No. 3339, Oct. 28, 1964, at 1; Chou Hsin-min, Organizational Ques-
tions on the Development of Legal Science in the Chinese People's Republic, translated in
JPRS, supra note 105, No. 4649, at 1, 2 (1961).
'3 See text at 106, note 114 supra.
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which would otherwise result when fundamental social change is
sought through rigid institutions. The Yenan legal process, in short,
typifies the sort of transinstitutional behavior often observed in con-
temporary Chinese political institutions.13 The Chinese experience
suggests that the conclusion of revolutionary conflict is not neces-
sarily a prerequisite to modernization, but revolution may contrib-
ute to the establishment of new progressive intrasocietal pro-
cesses. 31 Until coherent frameworks which more accurately analyze
the relationship of revolutionary behavior to legal processes appear,
attempts to view Chinese law in comparative perspective are likely
to remain inadequate.
The notion that Marxist-Leninists have history under their con-
trol is, of course, an enduring feature of communist movements. In
retrospect, however, the coherent, goal-oriented appearance of the
CCP's achievement appears exaggerated. The extent to which
"Maoism" is a utopian dream 13 or a fairly well-developed model for
modernization 40 is far from clear. At the very least, however, the
Chinese legal process has better served Chinese development in less
time than has the common or civil law served capitalist develop-
ment in the West. This fact alone makes the Chinese legal process
one which merits a more functional and sensitive approach to the
study of legal behavior, and one which cannot be considered of
relevance only to the Chinese.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This rather cursory survey of the Chinese legal process developed
from the mass line in Yenan has drawn conclusions about the nature
of Chinese law which, although exceedingly general, suggest the
need for a revision of certain assumptions commonly held by com-
parative lawyers. First, lawyers would benefit from broadening their
perspectives to focus on human behavior as both the primary sub-
ject and object of the legal process. By looking through legal institu-
tions, one is more likely to understand how those institutions affect
broader social dynamics and to determine better when those institu-
'" See Lubman, supra note 114, at 256-60; Letter from Daniel J. Hoffheimer to the Editor,
78 HARv. MAGAZINE, Jan. 1976, at 4-5.
' See Pye, Law and the Dilemma of Stability and Change in the Modernization Process,
17 VAND. L. REV. 15 (1963).
,"I For this view, see Moore, Utopian Themes in Marx and Mao: A Critique for Modern
Revisionists, DISSENT, Mar. -Apr. 1970. See also Tay, "Smash Permanent Rules:" China as a
Model for the Future, SYDNEY L. REV. 400 (1976).
"* SELDEN, supra note 53; D. Hoffheimer, supra note 83.
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tions do not reflect underlying values and thus actually inhibit
change. The study of law in the context of social processes is not a
new concept. It was advocated long ago by Oliver Wendell Holmes,
among others, as well as by the Maoists. 4 One might say that the
experience of the Chinese legal process, and not the logic of its
institutions, is what we mean by law.'
Law does not simply exist; it is created purposively. In an era of
rapid change, lawyers must pay less attention to the stabilizing
effect of law, which can stifle change and promote radical social
cleavages, and focus more upon the capacity of law to shape and
promote progress. As confidence in age-old liberal notions of law and
justice continue to erode,' and as world history creates new
"breakthroughs" like the Chinese revolution to which all others
must respond with new adaptive capacity,"' Western lawyers be-
come challenged to discover new paradigms"' to explain the role of
law in society. It is perhaps not too bold to suggest that the Russian-
American twentieth century will be followed by a Chinese twenty-
first.4 6 Although it is unlikely that Mao or his successors alone will
offer an entirely satisfactory substitution for systems of law and
process now prevalent in the West, the world's oldest nation, which
by the year A.D. 2000 will number over one-third of mankind, will
undoubtedly have distinct contributions to make to world law."7
The reluctance of Western lawyers to learn from the Chinese is
hardly conducive to persuading the Chinese that they have some-
thing to learn from the West. At the very least, the efforts of West-
ern lawyers to understand the social and political determinants
which have shaped and will continue to shape Chinese law must
avoid the simplistic and intellectually indolent tendency to analog-
ize China's experience to that of the West. "8
"' Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 475 (1897).
142 Cf. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
"I See Wood, Intervention and American Foreign Policy, 5 INT'L L. NEWS, Apr. 1976, at 1,
6.
' See T. PARSONS, SOCIETIES: EVOLUTIONARY AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 23-24 (1966).
I" Cf. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). The theory of para-
digms, however, must be used cautiously when applied to Chinese law and society. See
Hoffheimer, supra note 6 at 32.
"' See Balazs, Tradition et Rkvolution en Chine, 19 POLITiQUE ENTRANOftE 291 (1954).
" Hoffheimer, Book Review, HARv. POL. REv., Summer 1973, at 25, 27 (review of China's
Practice of International Law (J.A. Cohen ed. 1973)).
10 For a recent warning against such analysis, see Fairbank, Peking Politics; A Westerner's
Guide, HARv. MAGAZINE, Sept. 1976, at 18, 22. See also Lubman, On Understanding Chinese
Law and Legal Institutions, supra note 106, at 597, 599.
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